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In her article, Hall puts the Conversation Analysis (CA) mechanism of repair on the 
agenda of language learning research, and I think this is most welcome. However, our 
conceptions of the ontology, purpose and use of the CA mechanism of repair differ 
completely. In the first part of this article I explain how the interactional organisations 
of CA (turn-taking, sequence, repair) were intended to be employed normatively for 
emic analysis in ethnomethodology. I also explain how linguists have attempted to 
‘linguistify’ or adapt these organisations to conform to a descriptivist linguistic 
paradigm and will show that this adaptation renders them incapable of being used for 
emic analysis. I further argue that Hall is attempting to linguistify the organisation of 
repair and render it static and uni-dimensional as an analyst’s concept for coding 
interaction, whereas it is a participants’ concept which they adapt and employ 
normatively to perform their social actions; our task as analysts is to trace how they 
do this.  
As a gross generalization, CA methodology has often been misunderstood by 
linguists. This is, in a sense, quite natural and the reasons for this are quite easy to 
trace. Firstly, sociologists (who developed CA) have rarely tried to explain the 
ethnomethodological principles on which CA is based in terms which are 
comprehensible to linguists. By contrast, the interactional organizations of turn-
taking, adjacency pairs, and repair are readily comprehensible and very useful to 
linguists and appear at first sight to fit neatly into a descriptivist linguistics paradigm 
of units and rules. So it is in a sense quite natural that introductory texts on discourse 
analysis for linguists (e.g., Burns, 2001; Cameron, 2001; Cook, 1989; McCarthy, 
1991) should have introduced the above types of interactional organization without 
explication of the ethnomethodological principles which revealed them. The same 
point applies to their introduction in Hall’s article. Linguists reading such accounts of 
the organizations might naturally assume by default that turn-taking, sequence and 
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repair were a system of units and rules in the sense of descriptivist linguistic 
methodology and that they were the methodology of CA. By contrast, a brief 
introduction for social scientists (Bryman, 2001) starts with the principles of 
reflexivity and indexicality. It should be noted that Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson  
(1974) presented their model of turn-taking in a linguistics journal without explicating 
the ethnomethodological principles on which their work was based or the ways in 
which they differed from linguistics. It is again easy to understand how the confusion 
has arisen. In any case, there is now a common misconception among linguists that 
doing CA is a matter of transcribing talk and then identifying or coding patterns of 
turn-taking, adjacency pairs, and repair; the ethnomethodological principles, emic 
perspective and the dimension of social action are entirely absent. There is no space 
here to explain the ethnomethodological principles which underlie CA; see Seedhouse 
(2004) for these. Rather, I will exemplify how linguists have ‘linguistified’ CA 
organisations and explain, by contrast, how CA organisations are intended to be 
employed in ethnomethodological CA.  
We will now look at three different but related types of interactional 
organization which were uncovered by Sacks and associates by grappling with their 
data and which can now be employed in analysis by CA practitioners: turn-taking, 
sequence and repair. First we should clarify that these organizations are not the same 
as ‘units of analysis’ in the linguistic sense. Rather, they should be understood as 
interactional organizations which interactants use normatively both as an action 
template for the production of their social actions and as a point of reference for the 
interpretation of their actions. We as analysts are obliged to use them in the same way 
if we want to create an emic perspective. Since the emic/etic distinction is vital to this 
article, we need to define it at this point. An etic or analyst’s perspective views 
interaction from outside an alien system, using procedures and criteria alien to the 
system. An emic perspective views interaction from the participants’ perspective, 
using the same procedures and criteria as them. There is no sense that either 
perspective is inherently superior to the other, and CA does not claim that social 
actions and emic perspectives are inherently more important than language or etic 
perspectives per se; it is simply the case that CA’s unrelenting aim is to portray social 
action in interaction from an emic perspective. What CA means by an emic 
perspective, however, is not merely the participants’ perspective, but their perspective 
from within the sequential environment in which the social actions were performed. 
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Here the interactants talk their social world into being by employing the context-free 
interactional architecture in context-sensitive ways. The participants display in the 
interaction those terms of reference which they employ and these provide us with 
access to the emic perspective; I explain below what is meant by this. The ease with 
which the organisations of CA may be misunderstood is well captured by ten Have: 
In its first phase CA’s conceptual apparatus was developed in its originators’ 
struggle with the data, while in its second phase this apparatus is generally 
available as an established repertoire… The danger in this situation is that 
less talented, insightful, or sensitive practitioners may be tempted to ‘apply’ 
the established concepts in a mechanistic fashion, as ‘coding instruments’… 
In other words, the temptation is to use CA’s previously established concepts 
and findings as law-like or even ‘causal’ rules, whereas one should … see 
them as descriptions of possible normative orientations of participants, 
available for various usages as they see fit. (ten Have, 1999, p. 41)  
I firstly examine a linguistic CA misconception of the organisation of turn-
taking. Cameron (2001) introduces the CA model of turn-taking using data1 in which 
friends speak simultaneously.  
 
Extract 1  
A: and she didn’t she didn’t like Katie she didn’t ge[t on with Katie at all        ]  
B:                  [no she didn’t get on with ] Katie  
(Cameron, 2001, p. 92)  
Cameron refers to similar observations in two other publications and concludes:  
The simplest systematics model assumes that ‘one at a time’ is both normal 
and fundamental: there is no obvious place in the model for simultaneous 
speech which is neither an error nor a violation, but merely a normal feature 
of certain kinds of talk. The question this raises is whether Sacks and 
colleagues make assumptions about talk-in-general which are not, in fact, 
universally valid… if the analyst’s claim is that ‘one speaker speaks at a 
time’, one would expect participants in talk to display their orientation to that 
pattern by treating instances of simultaneous speech as problems requiring 
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repair… But in … the conversation… reproduced above, there is no display 
of orientation to the ‘one speaker speaks at a time’ pattern, and this is what 
motivates speculation that some other system of floor organization may be 
operative. (Cameron, 2001, p. 93)  
The linguistic CA perspective, then, is that ‘one at a time’ is a rule and that if 
speakers do not follow this, there is something wrong with the rule. However, in 
ethnomethodological CA, the turn-taking model is a constitutive norm which 
interactants make use of to display the meaning of their social actions to their partners 
and to interpret their partners’ actions. It is indeed common for close friends, family 
and associates to use overlap and simultaneous speech and this may be significant 
social action, although this would have to be explicated on a case by case basis. As 
Schegloff (2000) puts it, “Specific action … outcomes are co- constructed by 
reference to one-party-at-a-time, even though they are realized through designedly 
simultaneous talk” (p. 48). It is quite common for preferred second turns such as 
acceptance of an invitation or agreement to be undertaken in overlap, as in extract 1. 
The point is that it may be precisely by reference to the transition relevant point and 
the norms of turn-taking that close friends and family index their degree of agreement 
and affiliation and talk a relationship of intimacy and a context of informality into 
being. Similarly, it may be precisely by reference to the norms of turn-taking and to 
the transition relevance point that we display disaffiliation.  
 
Extract 2 
C:  We:ll I wrote what I thought was a a-a  
    Rea:son[ able explanatio:n 
F:                [ I: think it was a very rude le:tter. 
(Levinson, 1983, p.299) 
 
F begins his/her turn in the middle of ‘reasonable’. This cannot be considered 
a transition relevant point, so it must be an interruption. This is confirmed by the 
disaffiliative social action embodied in F's turn, which directly contradicts first 
speaker and the ‘bald’ linguistic formatting, with no attempt at mitigation. Overlap, 
then, may be designedly used to intensify the affiliative or disaffiliative nature of 
particular social actions. The degree of B’s agreement in extract 1 and of F’s 
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disagreement in extract 2 is indexed by and documented by the timing of the overlap 
as well as by its linguistic formatting. In other words, the interactants perform their 
social actions precisely by normative reference to the model of turn-taking. The 
interactional organizations themselves are stated in context-free terms, but the vital 
point is that participants employ these context-free organizations in a context-
sensitive way to display their social actions. It is because the participants (and we as 
analysts) are able to identify the gap between the context-free model and its context-
sensitive implementation that they (and we as analysts) are able to understand the 
social significance of the context-sensitive implementation. It is essential to 
understand that this matching procedure is the basis for the CA claim to develop an 
emic perspective. A common linguistic misunderstanding is that identifying or coding 
patterns of turn-taking, adjacency pairs etc. somehow creates an emic analysis; rather, 
it produces etic coding. 
We now move on to the organisation of sequence. A typical “linguistic” 
misunderstanding of adjacency pairs is that they are part of a descriptivist system of 
units and rules which are etically employed. For example, Burns (2001) suggests that 
“A weakness of CA resides in the fact that we still do not have precise ways of 
recognizing adjacency pairs” (p. 134). In linguistic CA, then, the analyst tries to 
identify or code instances of adjacency pairs from the analyst’s perspective. In 
ethnomethodological CA, however, the analyst’s job is to understand how participants 
normatively employ the organisation of adjacency pairs to perform their social 
actions.  Interactants make normative use of adjacency pairs (and other interactional 
organisations) in many unusual and creative context-sensitive ways in order to 
perform specific social actions and solve particular problems. In the following extract, 
lines 20 and 21, for example, we see George Bush senior normatively employing the 
adjacency pair organisation in a particularly creative way during a TV interview by 
Dan Rather. From a linguistic CA perspective there are no adjacency pairs as such 
and so the passage cannot be analysed: 
 
Extract 3 
13 Rather: =.hhh You've a:lso [said that-that you ]= 
14 Bush:           [Exactly. (Many-) ] 
15 Rather: =[did not] know:: that you: ] 
16 Bush:    [May I- ] May  I  May  I   ] answer that. 
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17 Rather: Tha[t wasn't a ques]tion. It was= 
18 Bush:        [(Th- right        ] 
19 Rather: [=a statement. ] 
20 → Bush:  [Yes  it   was  ] a statement,= 
21 =[an' I'll a:nswer it.=  The   President=  ] 
22 Rather:   [Let me ask the question if I may first.] 
23 Bush:  =created this progra:m, .hh has testifie- er: 
(Schegloff, 1992, p. 130) 
 
It is because the participants (and we as analysts) are able to identify the gap 
between the context-free model and its context-sensitive implementation that they 
(and we as analysts) are able to understand the social significance of the context-
sensitive implementation. So in the example above it is precisely because we know 
what the context-free norms of adjacency pairs (and turn-taking) are that we are able 
to analyse Bush's normative use of them as being very unusual and draw implications 
as to the motivation for his actions. The institutional expectation in the news interview 
is that Rather asks a question for Bush to answer. By trying to ‘answer’ a statement 
(or rather a pre-question), Bush gives the impression of trying to pre-empt delivery of 
a real question and of having something to hide.2  
CA, then, provides context-free statements (or definitions) of an organisation. 
Ehtnomethodological CA analysis then involves matching this context-free statement 
to the participants’ context-sensitive implementation of these organisations in their 
talk and revealing the value of the social actions thus performed. Linguistic CA, 
however, uses only the context-free statements of the organisation in order to etically 
‘code’ the interaction rather than to emically analyse it. This is exactly what we find 
in Hall’s article in her treatment of the organisation of repair. Hall uses the context-
free definition of repair to label or code extracts as either repair or correction and 
there is no attempt at emic analysis of data. There is no attempt to understand how 
participants adapt the mechanism of repair to their social actions in a context-sensitive 
way. The organisation of repair becomes fixed, static and uni-dimensional, an etic or 
analyst’s construct rather than a participants’ construct available for emic analysis. 
In ethnomethodological CA, however, analysts attempt to uncover how the 
participants have normatively employed the mechanism of repair to perform their 
social actions. A broad CA definition of repair is as the treatment of trouble occurring 
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in interactive language use. Trouble is anything which the participants judge is 
impeding their communication and a repairable item is one which constitutes trouble 
for the participants. Any element of talk may in principle be the focus of repair, even 
an element which is well-formed, propositionally correct and appropriate. Schegloff, 
Jefferson and Sacks (1997, p. 363) point out that “nothing is, in principle, excludable 
from the class ‘repairable’”. Repair, trouble and repairable items are participants’ 
constructs, for use how and when participants find appropriate. A CA definition of 
‘correction’ is ‘replacement of a trouble item by another item’.  Initiation and 
performance of correction can be undertaken by self or others, so a variety of 
trajectories are possible. The term ‘correction’ has no special status in CA in relation 
to ordinary conversation or institutional discourse – it is merely one practice amongst 
many in the numerous repair options available to interactants. The correct CA 
perspective on the relationship between repair and correction is provided by Hutchby 
& Wooffitt (1998, p. 57): 
 
 Repair … is a generic term which is used in CA to cover a wide range of 
phenomena, from seeming errors in turn-taking …. to any of the forms of 
what we commonly would call ‘correction’ – that is, substantive faults in the 
content of what someone has said. 
 
Although Hall does not reference or discuss it, a major relevant aspect of CA 
work is the CA institutional discourse perspective; Drew & Heritage (1992) is the best 
known work in this area. These works make clear that, in institutional settings, the 
mechanisms of turn-taking, sequence, and repair are all re-organised and adapted in 
relation to the institutional goal. In institutional talk, the institutional goal and focus 
determine what constitutes trouble and what the focus and conduct of repair is. In 
courtroom cross-examination of a witness by an opposing lawyer, for example, a 
failure by the witness to answer questions with yes or no may constitute trouble within 
that institutional setting (Drew, 1992). Such a failure is therefore repairable (for 
example by the lawyer and/or judge insisting on a yes/no answer) and even 
sanctionable. So within a particular institutional setting, the constitution of trouble, of 
what is repairable and how repair is conducted becomes adapted to the particular 
institutional focus.  
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Extract 4 
C:  Now Miss Lebrette (1.2) when you were interviewed by the police 
sometimes later – sometime later that evening (1.1) didn’t you te:ll the 
police that the defendant had been drinking  (.)   [did you tell them that 
W:            [ No I told them that 
  there was a coo:ler in the ca:r and that I never opened it = 
C:  =The answer er: may the balance here be stricken your honour and the 
answer is no 
J:  The answer is no 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, pp. 71-2) 
 
The legal aim of cross-examination is for evidence presented to court to be 
robustly tested. The organisation of turn-taking, sequence and repair become totally 
adapted to this aim in an inflexible sequence of questions by the lawyer to which the 
witness must answer yes or no. We see in extract 4 above that an answer may be 
deleted from the official record and be inadmissible as evidence if it is not in the 
correct format. Employing the ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity, we can 
see that it is not just that these organisations become adapted to the institutional aim. 
Also, the rigid organisation of turn-taking, sequence and repair talks the formal legal 
setting into being.  
Similarly, in L2 classrooms, the definition of what is trouble, what is 
repairable, and the entire mechanism of repair becomes adapted to the institutional 
goal of language learning and to the particular pedagogical focus employed. 
Seedhouse (2004) depicts how the mechanism of repair is re-organised in relation to 
the institutional goal of the L2 classroom.  
 
Extract 5 
 1 T: right, the cup is on top of the box, ((T moves cup)) 
 2  now, where is the cup? 
 3 L: in the box. 
 4 T: the cup is (.)? 
 5 L:  in the box 
 6 T:  the cup is in (.)? 
` 7 L: the cup is in the box. 
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 8 T: right, very good, the cup is in the box. 
(Seedhouse, 2004, p. 144) 
 
According to Hall, I am wrong to characterise  T’s actions in lines 4 and 6 of 
extract 5 as other-initiated repair; she says that T is in fact engaged in correction:  “To 
be other-initiated repair (OIR), as claimed by Seedhouse (2004), the teacher’s actions 
would have to display some trouble with hearing or understanding the prior student 
turns.” I will argue that the extract does in fact involve understanding and 
misunderstanding and that the teacher is indeed initiating repair. I will make first a 
general and then a specific point. The ethnomethodological CA perspective is that all 
talk inescapably involves displays of understanding and non-understanding:  
 
Built into the very organization by which opportunities to talk are allocated 
to participants in ordinary conversation is a related 'understanding-display' 
device. The consequence is that speakers almost necessarily reveal their 
understanding of that to which their talk is addressed, whether that is prior 
talk, other conduct, or events and occurrences 'scenic' to the interaction. 
When an utterance is addressed to prior talk, its speaker reveals some 
understanding of that prior talk, an understanding that the speaker of that 
prior talk may treat as problematic.  (Schegloff, 1991,p. 167-8). 
 
 Looking at the extract from an ethnomethodological CA perspective, it does 
involve understanding and non-understanding and employs the mechanism of repair. 
What we need to do as CA analysts is to understand how T adapts and normatively 
employs the mechanism of repair. The major feature of the organisation of repair in 
this form and accuracy context is the very tight connection between the linguistic 
forms and patterns of interaction which the learners produce in the L2 and the 
pedagogical focus which the teacher introduces. In other words, repair may be 
initiated by the teacher if the linguistic forms and patterns of interaction produced are 
not exactly identical to those intended by the teacher’s pedagogical focus. In the 
above extract the teacher’s pedagogical focus is to get the learner (via L2 prompts) to 
produce a specific string of linguistic forms, namely “The cup is in the box”. I suggest 
in Seedhouse (2004) that the omnipresent unique feature of the L2 classroom is that 
there is a reflexive relationship between pedagogy and interaction. So participants in 
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L2 classroom interaction are always displaying to one another their understanding of 
the current state of the evolving relationship between pedagogy and interaction and 
acting on the basis of these analyses. In line 3, L displays an understanding of the 
relationship between pedagogy and interaction as being to supply an answer about 
location, which s/he does in line 3. Whilst this answer would be acceptable in a 
meaning and fluency context, T displays in line 4 an understanding that this is not the 
required relationship between pedagogy and interaction by initiating repair. This is 
designed to help L form a complete sentence, but this is misunderstood by L, who 
displays in line 5 the same understanding as before of the relationship between 
pedagogy and interaction. T therefore initiates repair again in line 6 and this time L 
displays in line 7 an understanding of the relationship between pedagogy and 
interaction as being to form a complete sentence; in line 8 T displays an 
understanding that this has been achieved.  
 The entire mechanism of repair, then, has been adapted by the teacher for a 
specific pedagogical focus. We can see that it is an unusual adaptation, in that the 
linguistically correct and appropriate learner utterance in line 3 is still subject to repair 
by the teacher. From the evidence of my database, repair of linguistically correct and 
appropriate utterances seems to be peculiar to form and accuracy contexts within the 
L2 classroom. An emic analysis, then, shows how T has employed context-free 
resources of repair in a context-sensitive way. We can also see the 
ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity here in the relationship between the use 
of repair and the pedagogical focus. It is precisely by T’s initiation of repair of a 
‘correct’ response that a form and accuracy focus is talked into being. The above 
extract certainly does not involve correction in the CA sense. As Hall herself writes, 
“Correction is a particular type of repair in which errors are replaced with what is 
correct”.  The teacher does not correct the trouble item, but rather initiates repair so 
that the learner is eventually able to self-repair in line 7. Readers can decide for 
themselves whether they prefer my analysis or Hall’s description of extract 5 as the 
participants sailing through an IRF sequence “with no apparent disfluency or 
uncertainty”.  
Hall does not state which methodology she is employing in her article and this is 
unclear as different concepts and methodologies are mixed. She quotes CA definitions 
of repair but does not employ the mechanism in ethnomethodological CA fashion. 
Hall also places great emphasis on the IRF sequence, which does not derive from CA 
 11 
at all, but from discourse analysis (DA) (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975; Mehan, 1979), 
which is perfectly compatible with descriptivist linguistic methodology. Certainly her 
description of extract 5 is much more DA than CA. I suggest in Seedhouse (2004) that 
ethnomethodological CA can provide us with an overall description of the 
interactional organisation of the language classroom, its basic sequence organisation 
and an emic methodology for its analysis. However, this can only be the case if its 
organisations are employed holistically using ethnomethodological principles. Hall’s 
approach of mixing linguistic CA with DA will only provide us with more superficial 
etic coding schemes. In ethnomethodological CA we are dealing with a holistic 
system of analysis and this is the case because the interactants are using the same 
holistic system of analysis themselves to organise their talk. 
In this article I have tried to distinguish ethnomethodological CA from linguistic 
CA. Many students of linguistics now believe doing CA to mean producing a detailed 
transcription and then merely identifying instances of turn-taking, adjacency pairs, 
and repair; there is etic description or coding of superficial linguistic features rather 
than an analysis of social action. Linguistic CA is basically CA minus the 
methodology. Metaphorically, it presents the reader with a Porsche which has had a 
lawn-mower engine put in it instead. It may have the same name badge and bodywork 
and crawl forward in the same direction after a fashion, but the power is no longer 
there.  
We should consider whether there is any fundamental objection to having two 
alternative versions of CA. In my view there is no crucial problem provided that the 
two versions are separated, defined and named differently. Some linguists will no 
doubt continue to find it useful to etically employ the interactional organizations as a 
coding scheme in a descriptivist linguistic paradigm. Provided that it is recognized 
that this is linguistic CA and is different to doing CA analysis, I cannot see any 
fundamental objection. This separation and re-naming would avoid the current 
problem which does seem to me to be very serious. This is the current blurring 
between the two versions which gives the impression to many linguists that 
ethnomethodological CA is a superficial coding scheme. So, for example, we saw 
above that Cameron’s introduction to CA suggests that CA is unable to handle 
straightforward data, whereas the ethnomethodological version is perfectly capable of 
doing so. The term ‘CA’ should be reserved for the original ethnomethodological 
version and ‘linguistic CA’ for the linguistic version. It is therefore possible that 
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formalizing a separation between the two versions would lead to greater clarity and 
understanding between all parties involved. 
 From the perspective of modern language teachers, does this debate have any 
relevance? I think it does relate to how the professional work of teachers in interaction 
is portrayed. In Seedhouse (2004) I use a CA approach to show that, by virtue of 
language being the object as well as the vehicle of instruction, L2 teachers are doing 
fantastically complex and demanding interactional and pedagogical work on multiple 
levels, compared with 'content' teachers and compared with professionals in other 
institutional settings. By contrast, coding approaches tend to represent language teachers 
as doing one thing on one level at a time and as plodding from one monotonous IRF 
cycle to the next. I would suggest that this does not do justice to the complexity of the 
interactional work we are engaged in and hence to our profession. 
Repair becomes, in the L2 classroom, an interactional and pedagogical 
mechanism of amazing power, fluidity and complexity. Rather than attempting to 
linguistify repair, rendering it uni-dimensional and static, we need to realise the full 
potential of the ethnomethodological conception of repair and to employ it to uncover 
the processes of instructed language learning. Certainly it takes a very long time and it 
is very hard work to train in ethnomethodological CA, but the results are worth it. In 
an interview directed specifically to applied linguists, Schegloff (Wong & Olsher, 
2000, p.126) issues the following challenge: 
 
…. It's not until our colleagues actually engage with materials, and try to 
make sense of them, and understand how they're orderly, how they are 
organized, how they underlie and underwrite what people do with their 
social lives in interaction. Not until then will they have a clue of what 
we've been talking about…. They'll think they have a clue, and that's what 
makes it more dangerous, because at least if they understood fully that 
they didn't have a clue, then they would be prompted to go on and to get 
into the thick of it, but often people think 'that's it'.  
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